Obscenity: Significance of Literary Value by unknown
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 10 
Number 1 Volume 10, Winter 1964, Number 1 Article 10 
October 2016 
Obscenity: Significance of Literary Value 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1964) "Obscenity: Significance of Literary Value," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 10 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol10/iss1/10 
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
tions ''-6 were necessary, and that there was
no clear yardstick by which the permissible
area could be delineated from that consti-
tutionally prohibited. 27 Mr. Justice Gold-
berg reasoned that "the First Amendment
does not prohibit practices by which any
realistic measure create none of the dangers
which it is designed to prevent and which
do not so directly or substantially involve
the state in religious exercises .... "12
The Court presented a few examples
which are indicative of the intimacy which
exists between religion and the federal gov-
ernment. 2 9 Oaths of office from President to
alderman conclude with the humble state-
ment "So help me God." Likewise each
session of Congress is opened with a prayer
provided by its chaplain. Each session of the
Supreme Court is commenced by a crier,
who in a short ceremony invokes the grace
of God. Furthermore, chaplains are pro-
vided in our military forces for spiritual
guidance.?
26 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 305-306 (1963) (concurring opin-
ion of Justice Goldberg).
27 Id. at 306.
28 Id. at 308. (Emphasis added.)
2 Id. at 213.
It is interesting to note that the Congress which
provided for chaplains in the Houses of Congress
and in the armed forces, was the same Congress




In recent years obscenity has been the
source of frequent litigation. There have
been conflicting decisions in which the courts
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The fact situation in the principal case
seems clearly to fall within the spirit of the
types of activity which are not violative of
the first amendment. Although the examples
in Abington are specific, they were certainly
not intended to be exhaustive. It would
clearly be unreasonable not to distinguish
between the recitation of a prayer or the
reading of a Bible in a classroom and the
authorization given to a group of people
to erect a religious display on public
grounds at their own expense. The signifi-
cant recognition by the Court in the principal
case is that some distinction must be made
regardless of what the distinction is branded.
The Court here has chosen to label the
degrees of involvement as "active" and
"passive." These labels may not necessarily
be the most appropriate. The Supreme Court
in subsequent cases may refuse to adopt
this precise language-whether or not they
do is not of major concern. The case under
discussion points up at least this-whether
there has been a violation of the "establish-
ment clause" is a question of the degree of
state involvement in a particular religious
activity. The Supreme Court, if faced with
a similar fact situation, might very well
categorize the degree of involvement here
present among its enumerations of sanc-
tioned activities and might well conclude
that such a determination was implicitly
mandated by A bington.
have tried to balance the basic constitu-
tional rights of the individual and the state's
police power of censorship.
In the case of People v. Fritch,' the de-
1 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1963).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
fendants were convicted of selling an ob-
scene book in violation of Section 1141 of
the New York Penal Law.' The book,
Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer, abounded
in narrations dealing with sex in the most
colloquial sordid terms. The defendants con-
tended that the passages had literary value
depicting the depressed post-World War I
conditions in Paris. The Court of Appeals, in
a 4-3 decision, held that the book was ob-
scene despite the fact that it might possess
"substantial literary merit."
There is no precise definition of obsce-
nity.' The Supreme Court, however, in the
case of Roth v. United States,4 set down the
following standard: "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
terial taken as a whole appeals to the pru-
rient interest." ' The Roth case also held
that ideas of even "the slightest redeeming
social importance" are protected by the first
amendment.' Because of this apparent con-
tradiction as to the weight to be given lit-
erary value vis-a-vis appeal to "prurient
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 provides: "A person
who sells ... any article or instrument of indecent
or immoral use, or purporting to be for indecent or
immoral use or purpose ... is guilty of a mis-
demeanor .. "
'1 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 48 (1960).
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 489. The standards expounded in Roth
are essentially the same as those advocated by the
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code
of 1962. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed
Official Draft, May 4, 1962). However, in that
same year the Supreme Court expanded its re-
quirements for a finding of obscenity. Not only
must a work appeal to the "prurient interest," but
it must also be "patently offensive to current com-
munity standards of decency." Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
G Id. at 484.
interest," various cases, both before and
after Roth, have advanced diverse solutions
to this problem.
In the case of Grove Press, Inc. v. Chris-
tenberry, a post-Roth case, it was held that
the general theme of Lady Chatterly's Lover
did not appeal to the "prurient interest." In
support of its holding the court stressed the
literary value, of the book as a whole.'
However, in the case of Commonwealth v.
Isenstadt, a pre-Roth case, the court found
the defendant guilty of selling an obscene
book and stated that it was irrelevant
whether the book possessed literary merit."
In United States v. Levine,- another pre-
Roth case, a third approach was adopted.
The test used was the weighing of the liter-
ary merit of the material against its effect
on "the salacity of the reader to whom it
is sent. '1 2 Thus the above three cases follow
different standards in determining obscene
literature. While the Isenstadt case finds
literary merit of no importance, Grove Press
emphasizes this. The Levine case's balanc-
ing approach falls somewhere in the
middle.1 3
T 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1959).
8 Id. at 437.
318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
I d. at 847.
1 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
2 Id. at 158.
13 For cases holding literary value irrelevant, see
People v. Dial Press, Inc., 182 Misc. 416, 48
N.Y.S.2d 480 (Magis. Ct. 1944); People v. Friede,
133 Misc. 611, 233 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Magis. Ct.
1929); People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y.
Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924). For cases declaring
literary value of utmost importance, see St. Hubert
Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N.Y. Supp.
582 (Sup. Ct. 1909); People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.
S.2d 968 (Magis. Ct. 1951). For cases consider-
ing literary value to be of varying degrees of im-
portance, see Capitol Enterprises v. City of Chi-
cago, 260 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1958); American
Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d
334, 121 N.E.2d 585, appeal denied, 348 U.S. 979
(1954).
Recently there have been three decisions
contrary to People v. Fritch on the same
subject - Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer.
First, in Zeitlin v. Arnebergh,'14 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that this book
was not obscene. The City of Los Angeles,
the defendant, contended that "redeeming"
should be the word emphasized in the
phrase "utterly without redeeming social
importance" (the test from the Roth case),
and thus, the true test is the weighing of the
social importance of the material against its
"prurient appeal." The court rejected this
contention and emphasized the word "ut-
terly," a term which permits no such balanc-
ing. The California court stated that if any
matter of social importance exists, this will
"recover for the material its position as con-
stitutionally protected utterance.' 1 5
In McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer,6 the
court applied the "prurient interest" test,17
but also stated that a work possessing "re-
deeming social importance" will not readily
be declared obscene.' s In the third case,
Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic
of Cancer,"'' the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in emphasizing the guaran-
tees of the first amendment, used an obscen-
ity test which included only "hard core
pornography" without "redeeming social
importance." "2 0
14 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963).
15 Id. at 813.
16 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 245 (1963).
17 Id. at -, 121 N.W.2d at 554.
Is Id. at -, 121 N.W.2d at 550. "Where a work of
apparent serious purpose is involved, the scales will
not readily be tipped toward the determination of
obscenity." Ibid.
I' - Mass. -, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962).
20 Id. at -, 184 N.E.2d at 333-34. "With respect
to material designed for general circulation, only
predominantly 'hard core' pornography without re-
deeming social significance, is obscene in the con-
stitutional sense." Ibid.
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In the present case, however, the majority
opinion found Tropic of Cancer obscene,
stating that it appeals to the "prurient in-
terest," is "patently offensive," and is "hard
core pornography." 21 The Court rejected
the defendants' contention of "substantial
literary merit" stating that this is not the test
as laid down in Roth. The majority reasoned
that although Roth stated that " 'implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the re-
jection of obscenity as utterly without re-
deeming social importance'. . . it does not
follow that the converse is true; indeed, if
such were the case the holding in Roth
would be vitally eroded. ."..,,2 In its deci-
sion the majority relies on a report by the
New York Academy of Medicine Com-
mittee on Public Health which states that the
sale of salacious literature to the adolescent
has gone beyond thoughts, and has, in fact,
led to deleterious actions such as illicit sex-
ual relations, promiscuity, illegitimacy and
venereal disease.23 This is an unusual ap-
proach in that the Court has looked beyond
mere thoughts and has discussed the pos-
sible influences of salacious literature on the
actions of individuals. Thus the Court, al-
though not following the common-law rule
which held a literary work obscene if some
of its words had an adverse effect upon
the most susceptible person's thoughts, 2 4
seems to be concerned with the book's effect
upon the actions of the most susceptible -
21 People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 123, 192
N.E.2d 713, 716, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1963).
2lId. at 125, 192 N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d at
6-7.
23 "It can be asserted, however, that the perusal of
erotic literature has the potentiality of inciting
some young persons to enter into illicit sex rela-
tions and thus of leading them into promiscuity,
illegitimacy and venereal disease." Id. at 122 n.
4, 192 N.E.2d at 715 n.4, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 4 n.4.
24 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
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the adolescents.
Finally, the majority stated that "flagrant
obscenity" is not eliminated by the favorable
comments of a few literary critics. 25
The dissent relied on the literary merit of
the book as a factor precluding a holding of
obscenity. Judge Dye discussed the domi-
nant theme of the book, and found it not to
be obscene because of the literary message
conveyed, that is, the depressed condition of
post-World War I Paris.2 6 Judge Fuld, in a
separate dissenting opinion, emphasized the
literary value of the book as attested to by
various critics, and therefore found it not
obscene.27
Thus, the Court in People v. Fritch has
interpreted the apparent contradiction in
Roth in favor of "appeal to the prurient
interest," rather than "utterly without re-
deeming social importance." In so doing, it
appears that the Court has applied a more
stringent interpretation of the Roth case
than have the courts of Massachusetts, Cali-
fornia and Wisconsin in dealing with the
same subject matter. Since all four cases
rely primarily on Roth and the standard it
provides, the results appear to be irrecon-
cilable. While the decisions against obscenity
emphasize "redeeming social importance,"
the principal case states implicitly that Roth
25 People v. Fritch, supra note 21, at 125, 192
N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S. 2d at 7.
23 Id. at 131, 192 N.E.2d at 721, 243 N.Y.S.2d at
12. "Like 'Ulysses,' it is a 'tragic and very power-
ful commentary' on the inner lives of human
beings caught in the throes of a hopeless social
morass." Ibid.
27 "Since 'Tropic of Cancer' is a serious expression
of views and reactions toward life, however alien
they may be to the reader's philosophy or experi-
ence, and since the book is not without literary
importance as attested by recognized critics and
scholars, it is our own judgment that the First
Amendment does not permit its suppression." Id.
at 133, 192 N.E.2d at 722, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
does not establish this test as a rule of law.2 S
With the exception of the present case,
the trend has been toward assigning greater
importance to the aesthetic values of ma-
terial in accordance with the standards of
Roth.' The principal case also differs from
the weight of authority on the issue of the
role of the literary critic in the determination
of obscenity. The majority in Fritch stated
that favorable comments from several lit-
erary critics could not be used as an indi-
cation of the non-obscenity of a book as
"this would permit the substitution of the
opinions of authors and critics for those of
the average person in the contemporary
community." 30 Most courts, however, indi-
cate a preference for the use of literary re-
views as an aid in determining whether a
piece of literature is obscene3 1 Further-
more, some experts believe that the opinions
of literary critics are so crucial that "its ad-
mission ought to be raised to the level of a
constitutional requirement. 3 2 They state
that without the assistance of literary au-
thorities many of our appellate courts will
28 Id. at 125, 192 N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d at
6. It should be noted the New York Court of
Appeals has stated that the Roth test is not bind-
ing on the state's interpretation of its obscenity
statute. People v. Richmond County News, 9
N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369
(1961).
'_9 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REv. 5, 96 (1960).
30 People v. Fritch, supra note 21, at 125, 192
N.E.2d at 717, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
31 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5
F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd sub. nom.
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); Halsey v. New York
Soc'y for Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136
N.E. 220 (1922); People v. Geothan Book Mart,
fnc., 158 Misc. 240, 285 N.Y. Supp. 563 (Magis.
Ct. 1936); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, May 4, 1962).
32 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 29, at 98.
be unable to conduct an intelligent review
of obscenity decisions."
Today the area of obscenity has reached
a state of confusion because of the conflict-
ing interpretations of the Roth case. The
principal case stands in opposition to the
recent trend which places emphasis on the
"redeeming social importance" in determin-
ing obscenity. This interpretation is ques-
tionable because of the increased danger of
infringing on the constitutional rights guar-
anteed the individual by the first amend-
ment. On the other hand, it is advantageous
in that some form of censorship of obscene




satisfied if the released-time program re-
mained open to all sects and offered at least
one equal alternative to nonparticipants.
From what has been said to this point,
it should be clear that I agree with the many
commentators who regard McCollum and
Zorach as fundamentally inconsistent. In
my view, the released-time programs there
involved rise or fall together. If McCollum
is to be justified on the ground that the study
period offered to Terry McCollum did not
constitute a truly equal alternative to reli-
gious instruction, then Zorach was wrongly
decided because the same alternative was
there available. Following that interpreta-
tion of McCollum, however, would not
jeopardize the constitutionality of religious
instruction during school hours in public
school classrooms where a fully equal alter-
native is available to nonparticipants. On the
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high moral standard in the community, and
censorship will indeed be seriously impaired
if a work of minor "redeeming social im-
portance" falls under the protection of the
first amendment. Therefore, perhaps the
true test should be the weighing of the
work's "prurient appeal" against its social
importance, the outcome determining
whether or not a work may be judged ob-
scene. If the Supreme Court determines that
the protection of community morals is out-
weighed by the infringement of the first
amendment, it will have to clarify its posi-
tion, and thus formulate guides for other
courts.34
3I d. at 121.
other hand, -if McCollum and Zorach rest
on broader grounds, as appears likely, then
Zorach and not McCollum was the case
rightly decided.
I think that I have also made clear my be-
lief that the two fundamental constitutional
principles involved in released-time pro-
grams for voluntary religious instruction are
the primacy of parental rights in the educa-
tion of children and the necessity of an
equally attractive alternative for nonpartici-
pants. If both principles are followed, then
I do not see how released-time can be con-
demned without violating the neutrality
between belief and disbelief which the Su-
preme Court has held the first amendment to
enjoin. In the matter of religious instruction
within the framework of formal education,
Americans must examine their consciences
and determine just how sincerely they accept
the primacy of parental rights. The result
should not be in doubt once the issue is fully
laid bare.
